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Basis for Property Acquired for Stock
By John W. Roberts

In the revenue act of 1924 an attempt was made to stop the
leaks by enacting such rules as would prevent those practices
whereby many taxpayers were known to be reducing their tax
liability. It was brought out that men of wealth were employing
experts to search the law, find advantageous technicalities, and
devise lawful procedure for so organizing or conducting a business
as to subject it to the least possible taxation.
The treasury department had evidently made an exhaustive
study of the methods that were in common use. Some of them
attained much publicity, such as the investment of funds in state
and municipal bonds, and the administration’s effort to make
such income taxable was carried to the point of proposing an
amendment to the constitution of the United States. Many
others, however, were taken up quietly, and clauses designed to
stop them were recommended to congress and embodied in the
new law without attracting much public attention.
Of these clauses one of the most important concerned the
avoidance of taxable income by incorporating. The previous
revenue acts had provided that no taxable gain resulted when a
man or group of men turned in property to a new corporation for
its stock. The mere act of incorporating could not produce
taxable income. If, later, the corporation sold any of its assets,
the taxable gain was determined by comparing the proceeds of
the sale with the cost to the corporation, and the cost of assets
acquired for stock was taken to be their fair value as capital paid
in at the date when they were paid in.
To the average man, this may be very uninteresting, but to
men in certain situations it proved to have absorbing interest.
Mr. A. held stocks in numerous companies. They had been
acquired over a period of years and some had advanced and
others declined as compared with what they had cost. One
block of stock in Corporation B had been purchased in 1914 for
$100,000, but was now worth $1,700,000. All the other securities
taken together had cost him $900,000, and were now worth
$800,000. They were all listed stocks and their present value
was easily determinable. Mr. A. felt that the time had come
when it would be advisable to sell all or part of his holdings in
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Corporation B and was particularly anxious to diversify his
investments and not risk two-thirds of his estate on one issue.
If he sold, however, he would have to report a profit of $1,600,000.
Under the 1918 law his income tax would be enormous. Under
the 1921 law he could treat this profit as a capital gain and escape
with a tax of only $200,000. But even $200,000 is a large sum,
and might dissuade him from selling at all.
It was in this situation that he found the above-described
clauses of the law very interesting. After studying them, he
organized a new corporation known as A, Inc., with an authorized
capital stock of $2,500,000. To it he transferred all his stocks,
their definitely known market value being $2,500,000, and
accepted therefore the stock of A, Inc., with a par value of
$2,500,000. By so doing he had not derived any taxable income.
A, Inc., then very properly opened its books by an entry
showing $2,500,000 of capital stock issued and by setting up its
assets, consisting of stock of Corporation B costing $1,700,000
and other stocks costing $800,000. A, Inc., then sold the stock
of Corporation B for $1,700,000, and reinvested the proceeds in
other diversified securities. In so doing, the corporation had
realized no income. The sale of the large block of stock and the
diversification of investments had been accomplished without
incurring any liability for income tax either on the part of Mr. A.
or on that of A, Inc.
How many times this procedure was utilized, no one can say.
But it is common knowledge that private holding corporations
have become a usual thing among men of wealth. There are, of
course, other great advantages, and many corporations may have
been organized for those other purposes. Even in such cases,
however, advantage may have been taken later of the increased
valuation at which certain assets had been capitalized. It is little
wonder that the treasury department sought to close this avenue
of avoidance by proposing and securing the enactment of a change
in the law. The new clauses of the revenue act of 1924 read as
follows:
Section 203 (b) (4)
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a cor
poration by one or more persons, solely in exchange for stock or securities
in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or
persons are in control of the corporation; but in the case of an exchange
by two or more persons this paragraph shall apply only if the amount of
the stock and securities received by each is substantially in proportion to
his interest in the property prior to the exchange.
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Section 204 (a) (8)
If the property (other than stock or securities in a corporation a party
to a reorganization) was acquired, after December 31, 1920, by a corpora
tion by the issuance of its stock or securities in connection with a transac
tion described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (b) of section 203 (including,
also, cases where part of the consideration for the transfer of such property
to the corporation was property or money in addition to such stock or
securities), then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of
the transferror, increased in the amount of gain or decreased in the
amount of loss recognized to the transferror upon such transfer under the
law applicable to the year in which the transfer was made.

The latter clause was evidently suggested by a provision that
had already appeared in the revenue act of 1921 which based the
computation of income from the sale of gifts on the cost to the
preceding owner. But there is a fundamental difference in
the situation. A gift really is income to the recipient, and congress
doubtless has the right to tax the whole amount of the gift if it
wants to do so. It is free also to refrain from exerting its full
power, as it has done, and exempt from income tax a portion of
an item that really is income. That it did not in the 1921 act
exempt the whole, as it had done in previous acts, was a matter
entirely within its discretion.
But the above-quoted clauses regarding the basis for corpora
tions are applied to a radically different set of facts. They do
not offer an exemption to something that is in its nature income,
but attempt to tax as income something which is not income.
They were evidently believed both by the treasury department
and by congress to be sufficient to stop the leak. But do they?
Is the second one valid? Will the courts uphold it?
To revert to our concrete illustration above—Mr. A., person
ally, is clearly relieved of all taxability upon incorporating, by
the terms of section 203 (b) (4). The government can claim the
right to tax only the corporation, A, Inc. It will require
the corporation to compute its taxable income by comparing the
selling price, $1,700,000, with the cost to the preceding owner,
$100,000, and report a taxable income of $1,600,000. Can the
corporation have a taxable income, if it has no income?
A, Inc., has made no profit. The stock of Corporation B was
accepted as capital paid in, and was valued at its actual value as
of the date of payment. It constituted $1,700,000 of capital
paid in. The sale merely converted the asset into cash. It still
represented only capital paid in, and no part of the $1,700,000
represented any profit. And yet the law attempts to assert that
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it had realized a taxable net income of $1,600,000. Can congress
by legislative fiat make income of that which is not income?
In the revenue act of 1916, congress enacted that a “stock
dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of its cash
value.” But when the matter came to the supreme court, it was
decided that a stock dividend is not income. That fact controlled,
and could not be changed by any declaration of congress. The
gist of the decision was that congress can not tax as income, with
out apportionment, that which is not income.
But, it will be objected, there must be income somewhere in
the transactions above described. Whether there is or not, it is
clear that A, Inc., has no income, and it is against A, Inc., that
the right to tax is claimed. It may be perfectly true that there is
income somewhere in New York, but that would be no ground for
assessing John Doe, a resident of New York, if he could show that
he, personally, had no income.
If there is income somewhere in the transactions, who has
derived it? And when? When we study this question we must
at once see that unrealized income had accrued through rise in
market values over a period of ten years or so, while the stock of
Corporation B had been enhancing in value. But it was unreal
ized. Fluctuations in market value do not affect taxable income
as long as the stock is held and not sold. Certainly Mr. A.’s
wealth had increased during the ten years, but it was an increase
of capital and not income. He had not realized by a closed
transaction the increment that had accrued.
This rule may appear unjust to the plain, untutored citizen.
And to some degree and in some cases it undoubtedly is unjust.
But it is the rule, and must be applied to all alike, including Mr.
A. On the whole it is a sound and practical rule. Before the
plain, untutored citizen undertakes to change it he must devise
some other rule that will be as sound and as practical. At all
events, as the law now stands, Mr. A. can not be taxed during
those ten years on the increment in his capital due to market
quotations.
The first point at which there is any possibility of holding that
Mr. A. has derived income is the transaction whereby he ex
changes his various stocks for stock of A, Inc. If this occurred
in a year governed by the revenue act of 1924, the clear terms of
the statute exempt from taxation the income, if any, arising from
this transaction. The language of previous acts was not quite
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so clear, but we find in article 1563 of regulations 45 the treasury
department’s interpretation of the revenue act of 1918 expressed
in these words:
“ . . . , or if he exchanges his stock for stock in a small closely held
corporation, no income is realized if the new stock has no market value,
although the conversion is more than formal.”

A, Inc., is certainly a “closely held corporation.” Whether
it is “small” or not depends on what other corporations we com
pare with it. It would appear that the comparison contemplated
is with the large, diffusely held corporations whose stocks enjoy
a free market. And this again throws light on the words “market
value.” There is no market for the stock of A, Inc. It may have
a cash value, or a fair value, but does not, as far as I can see, have
a market value. So even under the 1918 act the mere fact of
incorporating does not entail the realizing of income.
This rule is sound, and based on sound theory. To derive
income by the act of incorporating would be like lifting oneself
by his boot straps. Income can not be derived from one’s acts
alone. It must be derived from others. One can not make
profits by trading with himself. After merely incorporating,
Mr. A. could not have felt justified in buying a house that he
could not afford before. His assets were not even more liquid
than they were before. The several certificates of stock, which
he had owned, had been exchanged for certificates representing
an equitable ownership under certain conditions and restrictions
in the same property; and the new certificates were less salable
than the old.
As mentioned above, the law does not attempt to assert that
Mr. A. derived income by the act of incorporating. Even if it
did, such an assertion could only await the same fate at the hands
of the supreme court as befell the clause that taxed stock divi
dends, because the act of incorporation does not produce or
realize income, but, like stock dividends, merely records devoting
to permanent capital use an increment in capital that might
otherwise eventually be devoted to personal expenses.
Did Mr. A. personally derive income when A, Inc., sold the
stock of Corporation B? No. Before the sale Mr. A. held the
stock of a corporation whose assets were worth $2,500,000.
After the sale he held the same stock in the same corporation
whose assets had the same value. As far as this transaction is
concerned Mr. A. personally has bought nothing, sold nothing,
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paid nothing, received nothing. He has not even experienced
any accrued increment in capital. By no stretch of the imagina
tion can it be said that he personally derives income from the
sale of stock of Corporation B by A, Inc. He does not even
derive a right as a director of A, Inc., to declare a dividend, for
the corporation has no profit out of which a dividend can be
declared.
Where, then, does the income lie? It lies simply and solely in
the ten years or so during which the value of the stock of Corpora
tion B was increasing. It was an unrealized increment of capital.
And neither the incorporation nor the subsequent transactions of
the corporation resulted in realizing the profit as income. The
government in most cases is not in any way deprived of taxes by
the careful study that such men give to the law. If Mr. A. had
not examined the constitutionality of the clause, but had ac
cepted its words at their face value, he probably would have let
things remain in statu quo, by simply retaining his personal
ownership of the stock of Corporation B, and the government
would have collected no tax.
The underlying considerations in this matter are very similar
to those in the stock-dividend case. In both cases the law dis
tinctly calls for the inclusion in income of something which is not
income. In both cases there has been a gradual accrual of capital
increment over a period of years. In both cases the specific
transactions alleged to have produced income are in the nature of
a permanent dedication to capital of an increment which other
wise might have been devoted to income.
In one point only does the analogy fail, and that is that whereas
the stock dividend was asserted to be income against a person
who had enjoyed the benefit of a capital increment, the alleged
profit on the sale of the stock of Corporation B is asserted to be
income of a person who had no profit and no capital increment.
In deciding a rule of law the court must consider how the rule
would work in cases other than the one specifically before it. In
the stock dividend case the supreme court did not fail to note the
evident injustice that would be done to the man who buys stock
just before the stock dividend is declared and really, in the high
price of the stock, pays for the new shares as well as the old. The
court took cognizance of the fact that not every recipient of a
stock dividend has held the stock during the entire period while
the profits of the corporation were accumulating. So, here, it
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must take cognizance of the fact that not every man who organ
izes a new corporation retains its stock until the corpration has
sold the assets that he transferred to it.
Mr. C. who was in a similar position to Mr. A. incorporated
with somewhat different purposes in view. His corporation did
not at once sell any of its assets, but he sold all the stock of
Corporation C to Mr. D. for $2,500,000. (We are assuming the
same set of figures.) Having done this Mr. C. reported an income
from the sale of stock of Corporation C of $1,500,000 and paid a
heavy personal tax. Eventually Mr. D., now in control of
Corporation C, causes it to sell its holdings of Corporation B.
Section 204 (a) (8) would then require Corporation C also to
report an income which would be computed as $1,600,000 and
taxed $200,000.
This tax of $200,000 comes as a surprise to Mr. D. Is there
any justice or any useful purpose in thus surprising him? Mr.
D. had carefully studied the assets of the company he was buying.
He had assured himself that the assets were worth all that the
books represented them to be, and that there were no liabilities
and no accrued taxes. He had done all that a cautious buyer
could be expected to do, and at the time of the purchase it was
true that no income-tax liability existed. The injustice to Mr. D.
is so evident that it needs no more discussion.
But here we have been dealing with a special type of corpora
tion. Let us see how the application of section 204 (a) (8) would
affect the great mass of business corporations. Most corpora
tions are started by some transaction whereby stock is issued for
certain specified assets turned in, sometimes a going business,
sometimes a patent, sometimes a mining claim.
Mr. E. at trifling expense secures a patent which has great
value. He organizes Corporation F and transfers the patent to
it for $800,000. To secure working capital he asks Mr. G. and
Mr. H. each to take $100,000 of the stock at par. Having in
vestigated the proposition and satisfied themselves that the
patent, valued at $800,000, pays for Mr. E’s stock as fully as their
cash pays for their own, they accept the proposition, and pay in
$200,000 of cash. Before operations are really commenced a
large and powerful corporation becomes interested and offers
$800,000 for the patent. Mr. E. regards a bird in the hand as
worth two in the bush, and, being in control of Corporation F, he
causes it to sell for $800,000. He figures that there will then be
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$1,000,000 of cash in the bank account of Corporation F which
can be paid back to the stockholders refunding their investment
and cancelling the stock.
At this point it is discovered that Corporation F has taxable
income of $800,000 and a liability of $100,000 for income tax, and
only $900,000 of free cash with which to redeem $1,000,000 of
stock. Mr. G. and Mr. H. eventually receive on dissolution
their shares of the corporation’s assets or $90,000 each. Mr. E.
on dissolution receives $720,000 which he is required to return as
income. Can anyone justify this double taxation of income, and
the losses thus inflicted on Mr. G. and Mr. H. by the operation of
this clause of the law?
It may be objected that corporations do not usually sell their
capital assets, and that therefore cases like the above are com
paratively rare. I admit that most corporations retain their
capital assets, or dispose of them through reorganizations for
which special provision is made in the law. But the clause in
question concerns only those corporations that do sell their capital
assets and in nearly every imaginable case in which it applies it
works injustice.
The only case where it does not work palpable injustice is where
the man who paid in property for stock is the sole stockholder and
retains his stock until all the assets in question have been sold and
the tax determined. But there is nothing in the clause that would
limit its operation to those unusual circumstances. And even in
the case where its injustice is not palpably evident, it results in
ultimate duplicate taxation of income, because a profit will again
be asserted when the sole stockholder sells his stock.
It is to be hoped that, when congress reassembles and takes up
another revision of the revenue act, this clause will be reviewed
and eliminated, both on the ground that it is probably uncon
stitutional and void, and on the ground that, even if valid, it
introduces needless intricacies and complications and fails to
accomplish justice.
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